Objective: A well-documented effect of focal ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) damage is a deficit in real-world decision making. An important aspect of this deficit may be a deficiency in "internal consistency" during social decision making-that is, impaired congruence between expressed preferences versus actual behavioral choices. An example of low internal consistency would be if one expressed the desire to marry someone with impeccable moral character, yet proceeded to marry someone convicted of multiple felonies. Here, we used a neuropsychological approach to investigate neural correlates of internal consistency in complex decision making. Method: Sixteen individuals with focal vmPFC lesions, 16 brain damage comparison individuals, and 16 normal comparison individuals completed a 3-option forced-choice preference task in which choices were made using attribute sets. Participants also completed visual-analogue preference ratings to indicate how much they liked each option, and rated the influence of each attribute on their decision making. Options were either social (potential spouses) or nonsocial (potential houses). Internal consistency for a trial was defined as agreement between the choice and the most positively rated option. Results: A mixed design analysis of variance revealed that internal consistency between choices and preferences derived from summed attribute ratings was significantly lower for the vmPFC group relative to comparison participants, but only in the social condition (p 2 ϭ .09), 95% CI [.002, .163]. Conclusions: Internal consistency during social decisions may be deficient in patients with vmPFC damage, leading to a discrepancy between preferences and choices. The vmPFC may provide an important neural mechanism for aligning behavioral choices with expressed preferences.
A well-documented effect of damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) is a severe deficit in decision making that can be notoriously difficult to detect using standard neuropsychological tests, and yet is plainly evident in the real-world behaviors of individuals suffering such lesions (e.g., Anderson, Damasio, Jones, & Tranel, 1991; Floden, Alexander, Kubu, Katz, & Stuss, 2008; Knutson et al., 2015) . Several case studies have provided detailed descriptions of the elusive nature of this deficit (Angrilli, Palomba, Cantagallo, Maietti, & Stegagno, 1999; Cato, Delis, Abildskov, & Bigler, 2004; Dimitrov, Phipps, Zahn, & Grafman, 1999; Eslinger & Damasio, 1985; Satish, Streufert, & Eslinger, 1999) . Despite sustaining damage to the prefrontal cortex, these patients demonstrated preserved general intellect upon neuropsychological testing. Perhaps even more striking is the fact that these patients often performed within the normative range on tests of executive functions-the very cognitive capacities traditionally associated with the prefrontal cortex (Tranel, Anderson, & Benton, 1994) . It became apparent that the salient deficit associated with vmPFC lesions was most clearly manifested in real-world behaviors rather than in the laboratory. For example, patient C. D. (Cato et al., 2004) , who was described as an exceptional student and prodigious military recruit prior to sustaining vmPFC damage, demonstrated a severe decline in social functioning which led to his forcible discharge from the military. Like other patients with focal vmPFC lesions, C. D.'s deficit was most conspicuous in his real-world decision making.
Clinicians and researchers who studied carefully the behavior of patients with vmPFC damage also noted a stark dissociation between these patients' ability to reason abstractly about social decisions and their ability to act upon this reasoning in a congruent manner. For example, patient E.V.R. (Eslinger & Damasio, 1985) , in response to a series of social judgment problems, demonstrated intact knowledge of appropriate normative responses, but behaved in an incongruent manner that has even been described as "sociopathic" (Eslinger & Damasio, 1985 , p. 1737 . Building on this finding, subsequent research demonstrated that individuals like E.V.R. could provide well-reasoned, normative responses to questions about complex moral dilemmas in a laboratory setting, but still display social decision-making impairments in analogous everyday situations (Anderson, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1999; Saver & Damasio, 1991) .
This striking lack of congruence between these patients' laboratorymeasured social decision making and real-world behaviors, referred to here as a deficit in "internal consistency" (cf. Henri-Bhargava, Simioni, & Fellows, 2012) , has captivated neuropsychological research for decades. However, this deficit has been difficult to measure empirically. One of the few successful demonstrations of this impairment utilized the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994) . In this task, designed to capture the subtle decision-making impairments of patients with vmPFC damage, individuals are asked to make a series of choices from four decks of cards in order to maximize their profit on a loan of virtual currency. With each choice, a reward and a penalty are delivered. Two of the decks are disadvantageous-they consistently bring high rewards, but also bring severe penalties that lead to an overall net loss when choosing from them. The other two decks are advantageous-they lead to consistently smaller rewards, but also lead to much smaller penalties, which render them profitable over time. When individuals with vmPFC lesions completed the IGT, they could often explain the contingencies of all four decks by the end of the task (Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000) . Despite this, they also consistently chose from the two disadvantageous decks, even at the end of the task. This pattern of performance on the IGT may reflect a deficiency in internal consistency during decision making.
Importantly, however, the IGT was not formulated with the goal of empirically measuring internal consistency, thus limiting the utility of the task for this purpose. In contrast, Henri-Bhargava et al. (2012) designed a two-option forced-choice paradigm specifically intended to measure internal consistency. In this study, stimuli were rank-ordered based on the frequency with which they were chosen across the forced-choice trials. Preference for a stimulus was operationalized as the rank-order of that stimulus-the more often a specific stimulus was chosen across repeated trials, the higher ranked that stimulus was in terms of preference. Internal inconsistency was defined as the number of deviations from preference (i.e., the number of instances in which the higher ranked of the two options was not selected). The investigators found that, relative to comparison individuals, patients with vmPFC lesions demonstrated greater inconsistency. It is noteworthy, however, that preference was measured as an ordinal variable. This approach limited the investigators' ability to consider the degree to which one stimulus is preferred over others. One can easily envision a scenario, for example, in which the most preferred option is only slightly preferred over the next best option. Poor internal consistency under such circumstances may reflect the difficulty of the decision. A rank-order approach to preference is unable to factor this possibility into an analysis. To our knowledge, no study has investigated internal consistency between a continuous measure of preference and choices among vmPFC patients within a multioption, forced-choice decision-making context.
Previous research has not included empirical investigations of how various stimulus characteristics might contribute to deficient internal consistency among patients with vmPFC lesions. In particular, although previous studies have often emphasized the social nature of this decision-making deficit, none have empirically tested whether deficient internal consistency among such patients is more strongly associated with decisions involving the integration of social stimuli relative to nonsocial stimuli. A better understanding of the nature of the stimuli most strongly associated with deficient internal consistency could have wide-ranging implications for patients with vmPFC damage. For example, if such damage is associated with a greater impairment in internal consistency during decisions involving social information, then practitioners may be wise to closely monitor and advise caregivers and patients about how such circumstances could compromise the coherence between these patients' stated preferences and final choices. A number of important life decisions (e.g., signing a will) often involve social information and would therefore fall under this jurisdiction. A more complete understanding of the stimulus correlates of deficient internal consistency may also carry implications for theories of the cognitive ontology (Poldrack, 2010) of decision making and its neural correlates. For example, this would add to a growing body of research suggesting the presence of two distinct executive function systems: a dorsal "cognitive" system and a ventral "social-affective" system (Barbey, Koenigs, & Grafman, 2013; Floden et al., 2008; Gläscher et al., 2012; Grossman et al., 2010; Robinson, Calamia, Gläscher, Bruss, & Tranel, 2014; Stuss & Levine, 2002; Tsuchida & Fellows, 2009) .
In addition to the social (vs. nonsocial) nature of the stimuli, other aspects of the stimuli may have important influences on internal consistency. One intriguing possibility is that internal inconsistency is attributable to the complexity of the stimuli in a decision space. Although the empirical literature on this topic is sparse, some researchers have still speculated that patients with vmPFC damage excel at neuropsychological testing but flounder in everyday decision making because real-world decision making is highly complex (Damasio, 1994) . A forced-choice moral dilemma, for instance, the type commonly used in experimental approaches (e.g., Koenigs et al., 2007; Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, & Eslinger, 2003; Shenhav & Greene, 2014) , dramatically constrains the decision space and possible outcomes; by contrast, even a seemingly simple choice between restaurants can take into account prices, distance, menu items, décor, likelihood of running into familiar people, and so on. In sum, there is some scant evidence that the complexity of the decision space is one reason behind these patients' deficient congruence between preferences and choices.
To address some of the unanswered questions regarding how various stimulus characteristics might contribute to deficient internal consistency, we designed a multioption, multiattribute decision-making paradigm to study internal consistency among patients with focal vmPFC lesions. The "social-ness" of the stimuli involved in the decision was our primary manipulation This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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of interest. The selection of a spouse from a set of potential spouses served as the social decision, whereas the selection of a house served as the nonsocial comparison decision. For both stimulus types, the process of selecting a single option based on a constellation of attributes requires one to: (a) weigh each individual attribute's importance, (b) assign positive or negative affective valence to each attribute, (c) integrate the collection of weighted attributes, and (d) use all this information to guide behavior (i.e., in the selection of a single option). Given that the complexity of the decision space could influence internal consistency during decision making, we added a manipulation of this factor as well. Complexity was operationalized as the number of attributes associated with each option during a decision. Specifically, two levels of complexity were included: four (simple condition) and eight attributes (complex condition).
In accordance with previous descriptions of the decision-making deficit associated with vmPFC lesions, we predicted that patients with such lesions would demonstrate a deficit in internal consistency during decisions involving social stimuli (spouses), but not during decisions involving nonsocial stimuli (houses). We did not have specific predictions about the effect of complexity on internal consistency. Rather, we included complexity so as to examine how it might interact with other factors, namely the social/nonsocial nature of the stimuli and participant group.
Method

Participants
Participants were 16 individuals with lesions involving the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), 16 brain damage comparison (BDC) individuals with lesions that did not involve the vmPFC, and 16 neurologically normal comparison (NC) individuals. All vmPFC and BDC patients were selected from the Neurological Patient Registry of the University of Iowa's Division of Behavioral Neurology and Cognitive Neuroscience. Patients in the vmPFC group were recruited on the basis of having brain damage that included the vmPFC whereas BDC participants were recruited on the basis of having brain damage that did not include the vmPFC region. All patient data were collected during the chronic epoch of the lesion. The participants in the NC group were recruited from the Cognitive Neuroscience Registry for Normative Data of the Division of Behavioral Neurology and Cognitive Neuroscience and from local ads. All participants received detailed information describing the experiment and gave informed consent prior to participating in the study. This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board for Human Subjects Research at the University of Iowa.
Demographic data regarding the participants are provided in Table 1 of Appendix A. The three groups were well matched in terms of sex ratio, handedness, age, education, IQ, and for the two patient groups, time since lesion onset (chronicity). All three groups contained identical ratios of males to females (5:3). The frequencies of mixed-, right-, and left-handed individuals were similar across the groups. In terms of lesion laterality, the vmPFC group was comprised largely of bilateral cases, whereas the BDC group consisted of only unilateral cases. There were no statistically significant group differences in average age, F(2, 45) ϭ 1. Table 2 . Lesion etiologies among the patients in the vmPFC group included cerebrovascular accidents (n ϭ 8) and benign tumor resections (n ϭ 8). Lesion etiologies among patients in the BDC group consisted of cerebrovascular accidents (n ϭ 12), tumor resections (n ϭ 3), and tissue resection for the treatment of epilepsy (n ϭ 1).
Figure 1 depicts a lesion overlap map for the vmPFC group. This image was generated using Brainvox software (Frank, Damasio, & Grabowski, 1997) , a program which utilizes the MAP-3 technique. This procedure reconstructed each patient's lesion mask onto a common template brain in three-dimensional space. All the individual patient lesion maps were then overlaid onto a single template brain map. A color-coded scheme was applied to the template brain to represent the number of patients with a lesion mask present in each voxel. Neuroanatomical data were based on structural MRI for patients 770, 2391, 3001, 3032, and 3349 whereas computerized tomography (CT) images were utilized for patients 297, 318, 1652, 1815, 1983, 2025, 2352, 2577, and 3383 . The neuroanatomical data for patient 3350 were deemed too difficult to trace due to tissue calcification. Additionally, patient 3456 did not have neuroanatomical research data available at the time of this study. However, this patient's clinical radiological report indicated that there was bilateral involvement of the vmPFC. Therefore, the neuroanatomical data for patient 3350 and patient 3456 were excluded from the lesion overlap image. The behavioral data provided by these two participants were retained for analysis.
Apparatus
All instructions and tasks were constructed and presented using Presentation® software (Version 13.0, www.neurobs.com). All stimuli were presented on a Compaq Presario ϫ1000 laptop with an ATI Mobility Radeon 9200, 15.4-in. color display. The connected keyboard was modified such that three keys were labeled with A, B, or C. The labels were written in red, blue, or green ink for A, B, and C, respectively, and were equally spaced across the length of keyboard.
Stimuli
Initially, 200 spouse attributes and 200 house attributes were created as the stimuli for this study. Some of the spouse attributes were selected from a pool of person attributes used in a previous study (Todorov & Uleman, 2004) . The remainder of the spouse attributes were created by an author (KC) who explicitly excluded any references to sexual characteristics and/or physical attractiveness in an effort to promote the use of personal preference in making a decision rather than normative standards (e.g., most people would want an attractive spouse). House attributes were created by the same author (KC) who utilized several home buying and house building/contracting websites as guides. House attriThis document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
butes that were deemed overly complex or associated with people (e.g., "has noisy next door neighbors") were excluded. The superset of 400 initial attributes was tested in a pilot study of 27 neurologically normal adults recruited from the University of This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. The remaining attributes were assigned by an author (KC) to sets of either four (simple condition) or eight (complex condition) on the basis of their mean weighted additive (WADD) score (Dawes & Corrigan, 1974; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993) from the pilot data. The WADD score for an attribute was the product of the influence rating and the valence of the affective rating. Summing the WADD scores for all the attributes in a set resulted in a single metric representing the net desirability of the associated option. Specifically, we inspected the distribution of these WADD scores across sets to ensure that each trial contained one option with the greatest mean sum of WADD scores relative to the other options. The manual assignment of attributes to sets ensured that no option contained attributes that were directly contradictory (e.g., one house could not have both the attribute "has a significant crack in the foundation" and the attribute "has a solid foundation"). Furthermore, this allowed us to prevent situations in which all the positive attributes of a set were grouped together and all the negative attributes were grouped together. This helped to prevent primacy and recency effects from influencing how participants responded to the forced-choice task (Newell, Wong, Cheung, & Rakow, 2009) . Correlations between the affective and influence ratings from the pilot data revealed that the two measures were highly correlated, which is not surprising due to the well-established and intimate relationship between valence and potency. For the social attributes, the Pearson correlation coefficient was r ϭ .63 for the positive and r ϭ Ϫ0.73 for the negative attributes. For the nonsocial attributes, r ϭ .86 for the positive and r ϭ Ϫ0.94 for the negative attributes. The valence (positive or negative) of each attribute was determined by the mean affective valence rating from the pilot study. The final attribute sets, developed by an author (KC), are listed in Appendix B, along with the corresponding valence and average influence rating.
Procedure
Prior to the start of the experiment, an experimenter gave participants a detailed description of the study procedures and began the informed consent process in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. Once participants consented to take part in the study, an experimenter explained the nature and order of the tasks. Participants were first asked to complete a forced-choice preference task, followed intermittently by a visual analogue preference task, and finally an attribute rating task. Instructions were presented to the participants on the computer screen and simultaneously read aloud by an experimenter. All participants were tested by the same experimenter (KC) and underwent the same procedure, using a standard script of instructions. For two patients (1 vmPFC, 1 BDC), the stimuli were read aloud to them due to visual or reading comprehension impairments. In these cases, the experimenter read the stimuli aloud in a neutral tone but did not interact with the participants unless the participants had a question about the task protocol.
Forced-choice preference task. The first portion of the study asked participants to complete a 3-option forced-choice preference task (see Figure 2 for examples). Participants were instructed that they would be presented with information about several groups of hypothetical people or houses and that each one would be described by various positive and negative attributes. They were instructed to read the attributes aloud as they appeared on the screen to ensure that they attended to each attribute. They were then informed that, after the presentation of the attribute sets for all three options, they would be asked to choose one person or house from each group of three. Participants were also explicitly informed prior to beginning the task that each group of options was unique and independent from all other groups (i.e., person/house A is not the same from trial to trial). For person trials, the participants were asked to select the person from each group of three that they would choose as a spouse or life partner. For house trials, they were asked to select the house from the group that they would choose to live in for the rest of their lives. In the interest of time, participants were encouraged to not spend too long making a choice and to go with their gut feeling if they were not sure which option to choose. Participants made their choices by pressing keys on the keyboard labeled with "A," "B," or "C." The choice trials were presented in blocks (one spouse block and one house block) and the presentation order of the blocks was counterbalanced across the participants such that half of the participants saw the house block first and the other half saw the spouse block first.
To begin each trial of the forced-choice preference task, participants were first shown a list of attributes and were told that these attributes were to be associated with option A (i.e., Spouse A or House A). The attributes for option A were presented one at a time in a fixed order across participants. Each attribute was displayed for six seconds and then remained on the screen until all the attributes for option A were displayed on the screen. Using the same procedure, second and third lists of attributes were subsequently associated with options B and C, respectively. Following the presentation of all three attribute lists, a separate screen prompted the participants to select the person they would choose This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
as a spouse or life partner or the house they would choose to live in for the rest of their lives. Lastly, the final decision screen was displayed to the participants. This screen showed all three options and their associated attribute sets at once, side by side, in columns separated by vertical lines. The left-most column contained the attribute set for option A in red text whereas the middle and right-most columns presented the attribute sets for options B and C in blue and green text, respectively. The final decision screen was presented in an effort to ease impression formation and working memory load for participants, particularly among those in the two patient groups. This decision screen remained onscreen until the participant made a choice by using the corresponding key on the keyboard. This format was repeated for a total of 10 house trials and 10 spouse trials. For each block (houses and spouses), a total of 6 trials contained options with 4 attributes per attribute set whereas 4 trials contained options with 8 attributes per attribute set. The former served as the simple condition trials whereas the latter served as the complex condition trials. In each block, Trials 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, and 10 were simple trials whereas Trials 2, 4, 6, and 9 were complex trials. In an effort to minimize the load on the participants, we included one fewer complex trial than simple trial. Each block was preceded by one practice trial. Visual analogue preference task. Immediately following each trial of the forced-choice preference task, participants were asked to rate their preference for each option in the preceding trial. They were instructed to indicate their attitude toward each option Figure 2 . Example forced-choice preference trials for the spouse and house conditions. For both the social (A) and nonsocial (B) conditions, (a) was presented first, with each attribute presented one after the other six seconds apart (depicted here by three dots between attributes); (b) and (c) were shown next; then the participant was instructed to make a choice and (d) was shown. The final screen remained onscreen until the participant made a selection, at which point they were instructed to complete the visual analogue task before continuing to the next trial. Two example simple trials are depicted. See the online article for the color version of this figure. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
using the visual analogue scale shown in Figure 3 . The distance from the left-most point on the scale to the right-most point was exactly 100 mm. The distance in millimeters from the left-most point on the scale to the mark made by the participants served as the visual analogue preference for each option. During this task, the final summary screen appeared five seconds after the end of the previous forced-choice preference trial (i.e., five seconds after the participants pressed a button to select an option) and remained on the screen while the participant completed the visual analogue scales for each person/house. After the completion of the visual analogue ratings, the participants were instructed to press the enter key on the keyboard to proceed to the next trial of the forcedchoice preference task. Attribute-rating task. After the completion of all forcedchoice preference trials and visual analogue ratings, participants completed the last portion of the study: the attribute rating task. The attributes themselves were the same attributes used in the attribute sets of the forced-choice preference task. The participants were instructed that they would see all of the previously displayed person/house attributes presented individually and that for each one, they were to rate how much influence or importance each attribute had on their decision of which person (or house) to choose as a spouse (or house). To clarify, participants were instructed that this rating was not a measure of how good or bad an attribute was, but instead, how important it was to them, or how much it would factor into their decision of which person/house to choose. All attributes were rated sequentially in two counterbalanced blocks consisting of either all the spouse attributes or all the house attributes. Each block was preceded by three practice trials. Participants were asked to rate a total of 180 spouse attributes and 180 house attributes for a total of 360 attributes. They rated these attributes on a 5-point Likert scale in which 0, 2, and 4 represented "Not at all", "Medium" amount of influence, and "A Lot" of influence, respectively. Examples of this task are depicted in Figure 4 .
Measures
Internal consistency. In order to calculate internal consistency, we first calculated WADD scores for each attribute to create a single numerical representation that takes both influence and valence into account. WADD models are considered standard in multioption, multiattribute decision research (Dawes & Corrigan, 1974; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Payne et al., 1993) . The WADD scores were calculated by multiplying each attribute's influence rating by either 1 or Ϫ1 (where 1 represents positive valence and Ϫ1 represents negative valence). For example, if a participant rated a negative attribute's influence as 4 ("A Lot" of influence), that attribute's WADD score was Ϫ4.
Because the attributes used in the attribute rating task were the same attributes used in the forced-choice preference task, we were able to sum the WADD scores for any option in any trial in the forced-choice preference task. The resulting scores reflected the influence and valence of the attributes associated with an option. This summary score for an option was termed the sum of WADD scores. As an example, if the attributes for option A in a simple trial were rated as Ϫ1, 3, 2, and 1, the sum of WADD scores for that option was 5. The average sum of WADD scores for each option in each trial is presented in Appendix B.
To calculate internal consistency, we examined participants' sums of WADD scores in relation to their raw choices (i.e., their responses to the forced-choice preference task) across trials. To do this, we first compared the sum of WADD scores for choices A, B, This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
and C for each trial. The option with the greatest sum of WADD scores was deemed to be the attribute-derived choice. Internal consistency within a trial was defined as agreement between the attribute-derived choice and the raw choice within a given forcedchoice trial. If the sum of WADD scores for two (or all three) choices were equivalent, such a trial was considered internally consistent if the raw choice for that trial agreed with either (or any) of those options. For example, if the sums of WADD scores for options A and B were both 2, and the sum of WADD scores for option C was Ϫ1, then an internally consistent raw choice would be defined as a raw choice of either option A or option B. The final metric to represent internal consistency was defined as the number of internally consistent trials divided by the total number of trials. For example, if a participant was internally consistent on five of the 10 spouse trials, then that participant's internal consistency was 0.5 (or 50%) for the spouse trials. Response time. Patients with brain damage generally show greater variability in their response times relative to nonbrain damaged comparisons. To the extent that this could affect decisional processes among the patient groups, it was important to measure the response time of the participants during the forcedchoice preference task. The amount of time, in seconds, that elapsed from the presentation of the final summary screen of a forced-choice preference trial to the selection of an option by the participant was defined as the response time for each trial.
Attribute-based choice difficulty. We might expect internal consistency to decrease for trials in which the option that was deemed the attribute-derived choice narrowly won out over the option with the next greatest sum of WADD scores. For example, if the sum of WADD scores for options A, B, and C were 3, 2, and Ϫ1, respectively, we might expect the associated average internal consistency for such a trial to be lower than the average internal consistency for a trial in which the sum of WADD scores for options A, B, and C were 4, Ϫ3, and Ϫ4. The average WADD score for each option was used in this calculation and for the analysis so that the simple and complex trials fell within the same scale, making them comparable in terms of this measure without changing the relative ranking of the associated options. Without this calculation, complex trials could range between Ϫ32 and 32, whereas simple trials could only fall within the range of Ϫ16 to 16. Comparing the averages of the WADD scores for the options in a trial restricted the range from to Ϫ4 to 4. To create a final continuous measure of this type of choice difficulty, we calculated the distance between the average sum of WADD scores for the attribute-derived choice and the average sum of WADD scores for the option with the next greatest sum of WADD scores. For example, if one trial's average sums of WADD scores were 3, Ϫ3, 2, and Ϫ1, then the attribute-based choice difficulty for that trial would be 1 (calculated by subtracting the second highest score, 2, from the highest, 3).
Results
Because the NC and BDC groups did not differ statistically on any of the dependent variables, they were combined into a single comparison group for the purposes of these analyses. The mean response time, attribute-based choice difficulty, and internal consistency for the vmPFC and comparison groups are presented in Table 3 . All analyses were performed using SPSS Version 24. Follow-up t tests were conducted using the DunnSidak correction for multiple comparisons. Also, we analyzed participant sex by including it as a covariate in the main analyses. This variable was subsequently removed, as the results of the analyses were not impacted by participant sex. Also, the two groups were matched in terms of sex ratio, and our pilot study had removed any attributes that differed by participant sex.
Preliminary Analyses
It is important to test whether the groups differed in terms of the rate at which they selected each foil in the forced-choice This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
preference task. To this end, we compared the response patterns of the two groups using three independent samples t tests: (1) 2 ϭ .14. Overall, there is no strong evidence of a group-related selection bias for a particular foil (A, B, or C).
Furthermore, it is important to inspect whether there were any group differences in terms of the proportion of participants that selected the "best" option across trials (i.e., the option that was set up to have the highest mean WADD score according to the pilot data). Treating this option in each trial as the "correct" option, we observed no group differences in selecting the correct option, F(2, 45) ϭ .98, p ϭ .39, p 2 ϭ .02.
Internal Consistency
Internal consistency data were analyzed using a 2 ϫ 2 ϫ 2 mixed-design analysis of variance (ANOVA) with group (vmPFC or comparison) as the between-subjects factor and stimulus type (house or spouse) and complexity (simple or complex) as the within-subjects factors. Because the underlying internal consistency data were in the form of a proportion, and because the underlying data were binary (consistent or inconsistent), the data were arcsine transformed prior to the analysis. Raw data are presented to avoid confusion about the meaning of the tail ends of the distribution. Response time and attributebased difficulty for the forced-choice task were entered as covariates. 
Exploratory Analysis
To complement the central finding from the main analysis, the internal consistency between visual analogue ratings and raw choice data was compared across the vmPFC and comparison groups. This was calculated for the spouse trials in a manner identical to the method described for the calculation of internal consistency between the attribute-derived choices and raw choices. Using this measure, most participants in both the vmPFC and comparison groups were either very high in internal consistency or internally consistent on all trials (i.e., 100%). This was expected given the fact that the visual analogue ratings immediately followed the raw choice data, likely eliciting strong demand characteristics. The distribution of these data resulted in a severe violation of the assumption of normality. As such, we analyzed the data using a nonparametric test.
The two groups of participants were classified as either internally consistent (100% internal consistency) or internally inconsistent (Ͻ100% internal consistency) with respect to the visual analogue ratings and raw choice data. Table 4 presents the number of consistent and inconsistent participants in this analysis by group along with the corresponding percentage of the total sample for each count. The resulting distribution did not satisfy one of the assumptions for a chi-square analysis. Each cell in a chi-square must have a count of at least five cases, but only two participants from the comparison group were inconsistent. The Fisher's exact test correction was applied. This test revealed a significant difference in the distribution of participants (p Ͻ .05). The percent of internally consistent and inconsistent participants are compared across groups in Figure 6 . The percent of participants was used in lieu of the count because the comparison group contained twice as many participants as the vmPFC group. A greater percent of the This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
participants in the vmPFC group (31.25%) were internally inconsistent on at least one trial compared with the comparison group (6.25%).
Conclusions
Patients with damage to the vmPFC often display poor congruence between their cognitive abilities and real-world behaviors following the onset of their lesions. The current study examined stimulus correlates of this deficit in "internal consistency," which was operationalized as agreement between stated or inferred preference and choice during a three-option forcedchoice preference task. We tested the hypothesis that decisions involving social stimuli would be associated with attenuated internal consistency among patients with focal vmPFC damage. The results demonstrated that persons with focal vmPFC lesions exhibited reduced internal consistency between their preferences and choices relative to comparison individuals, but only for decisions involving the selection of a spouse as opposed to the selection of a house.
The attenuated congruence between preferences and choices among vmPFC patients was observed both when preference was inferred from individual attribute ratings as well as when preference was determined by asking the participants directly about how much they liked each option. There are likely strong demand characteristics at play in the latter scenario-the participants made their choices just prior to indicating how much they preferred each option. It might be expected, then, that most individuals would be internally consistent under these circumstances. Indeed, this is exactly what we observed for the comparison group. In contrast, patients with focal vmPFC lesions were much more likely to be internally inconsistent on at least one such trial. That these patients' preferences and choices did not more frequently coincide despite being measured within seconds of one another adds important perspective to our primary finding.
In accordance with previous research, the present study suggests that the vmPFC may be involved in maintaining congruence between cognitive abilities and behavior. Furthermore, this study extends upon previous studies in two important ways: (1) it suggests that the nature of the information under deliberation plays an important role in the whether this deficit is manifested during a particular decision, and (2) it demonstrates that this deficit can be measured empirically in a multioption, multiattribute decision-making paradigm. Our finding that reduced internal consistency is observed among vmPFC patients during social decisions coincides with, and lends empirical support to, previous research (Eslinger & Damasio, 1985; Saver & Damasio, 1991) recognizing that social, real-world contexts most prominently evoke poor internal consistency among these patients.
However, our findings may appear to differ in some ways from those reported by Henri-Bhargava et al. (2012) . Namely, those investigators found some evidence of internal consistency among vmPFC patients for a range of categories, including some potentially "non-social" categories. This discrepancy could be due to methodological differences between studies. One key difference between the present study and HenriBhargava et al. (2012) was the manner in which preference for a stimulus was measured. Henri-Bhargava et al. used a rankorder approach whereas the present study used a graded approach. The approach of the present study allowed us to account for how much more one option was preferred to the others (i.e., the attribute-based difficulty). In contrast, the rank order approach employed by Henri-Bhargava et al. did not allow for this. Beyond the measurement of preference, other key differences between these studies include the number of options in the forced-choice task (two options in Henri-Bhargava et al. compared with three options in the present study), and the nature of the nonsocial stimuli used in each study. With respect to the latter, it is important to note that the patients in the Henri-Bhargava et al. study only demonstrated significantly greater internal inconsistency compared with healthy comparison participants on two categories: "vegetables" and "puppies." Although "vegetables" may certainly be nonsocial, "puppies" may certainly be interpreted as a social category. In sum, key methodological differences between the present study and Henri-Bhargava et al. may explain some apparent discrepancies between these two studies.
We did not find evidence that the complexity of the decision space interacted with any other factors. This finding stands in contrast to the notion that deficient congruence between preferences and choices among vmPFC patients during decisions is due to the complexity of those decisions. Our results suggest that the social nature of the decision itself may have been sufficient to impair the congruence between preferences and choices among these patients. Alternatively, it could be that the number of options, rather than the number of attributes per option, is associated with attenuated internal consistency. Indeed, complexity could conceivably be operationalized in a variety of ways that differ from how it was defined in the present study. As such, future studies should seek to clarify the role of the complexity of information in the maintenance of internal consistency.
In addition to our central finding, we found a large and unexpected main effect of the social/nonsocial manipulation on internal consistency. Specifically, the internal consistency for house trials was well below that of the spouse trials, across both groups and both levels of complexity (see Table 3 ). This suggests that the house and spouse stimuli were not well matched on overall internal consistency. However, this limitation does This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
not detract from the central finding of this study, as it did not result in ceiling or floor effects for internal consistency in either the house or spouse condition. It may be the case that this unexpected finding is attributable to differences between the spouse and house stimuli. For example, individuals may have more experience deciding between potential mates than deciding between potential houses. We might expect most people to have more previous dating experiences than house-purchasing experiences. Such disproportionate "practice" for one type of decision over the other might contribute to the discrepant internal consistency between houses and spouses. However, it is notable that practice with selecting a person to date is not equivalent to practice selecting a spouse (a decision which, for many, may only be made once). Another potential difference between the stimuli that could explain our unexpected finding may lie in the decision-making strategies that the participants used during the tasks. It may be the case that participants did not select houses using an additive model (i.e., the WADD model used to determine the most preferred option). Rather, participants may have employed a range of nonadditive heuristic strategies. This latter possibility would be interesting given previous research demonstrating that patients with vmPFC lesions employ non-normative heuristics during decision making (Fellows, 2006) . The present study was not designed to tease apart these nuances of the decisionmaking approach. However, it may be worthwhile for future studies to explore whether the decision-making heuristics utilized by patients with vmPFC lesions are dependent upon the nature of the stimuli under deliberation.
It is important to note that the present study does not suggest that incongruence between preferences and choices is unitarily caused by focal vmPFC lesions. Imperfect internal consistency was also observed among the comparison group in this studyeven between the visual analogue ratings and choices (a set of tasks which, as mentioned above, likely promotes internal consistency). That internal inconsistency is, to an extent, normative suggests that vmPFC damage is not the sole cause of incongruence between preferences and actions. Rather, our data only support the idea that vmPFC lesions are associated with more frequent instances of incongruence between preferences and choices than is to be expected among a normative population. Any conclusions drawn from this study about the role of the vmPFC in internal consistency should be interpreted in light of these considerations.
Although most studies of patients with focal and stable vmPFC damage include far fewer participants, the present study may still be limited by a somewhat small sample size. As is the case with other neuropsychological studies, small samples may give rise to concerns about the generalizability of results. Additionally, participants only completed a total of 20 trials. Given the various manipulations that we employed in this study (i.e., social/nonsocial and simple/complex), it may be the case that an insufficient number of trials were aggregated to properly measure internal consistency. Although this did not affect our ability to observe a significant effect of social stimuli on internal consistency, this limitation may have affected our ability to detect an effect of complexity.
The task utilized in the present study was novel, and thus warrants a discussion of its potential limitations and related alternative explanations for our central finding. Although the task was designed to mimic aspects of real-world decision making, it was also necessarily simplified into a standardized format that was feasible for laboratory research. As such, the possibility remains that our results may not generalize to realworld situations. Another important limitation of this task involves some potentially important differences between houses and spouses. For example, it might be common to sit down and deliberate rationally over a house but not a spouse. Such unfamiliar circumstances for making decisions about potential spouses may have affected our results. Alternatively, the house and spouse stimuli may differ in the affective information associated with each stimulus type. It may be the case that the affective information contained in the spouse stimuli drives our central finding. Disentangling the contributions of affective and social information to the deficient internal consistency of patients with vmPFC lesions remains an important goal for future research.
A final consideration concerns the nature of the spouse attributes. Some attributes are single behaviors that may or may not be indicative of a person's character across situations (e.g., "cursed at the flight attendant"). Others are more general statements that apply across situations (e.g., "becomes angry when people express ideas very different from their own"). It may be the case that participants focused on one or two attributes that apply across situations while discounting the others. We have the impression, however, that this possibility is accounted for by the nature of the influence ratings. If participants' decisions were not influenced by an attribute that described a single behavior, they were able to indicate that in their influence rating (i.e., they could assign that attribute a low influence rating). Indeed, the instructions asked them to approach these ratings in this very way. Alternatively, if an attribute provided information that can apply across many situations, and the participants found that attribute to be influential in their decision, they could assign that attribute a high influence rating. This approach allowed participants to decide whether a single behavior was important to them while also leaving room for the possibility that some people may find some single behaviors to be highly adjudicative with regard to their decision.
Moving forward, it may be worthwhile to develop and validate a laboratory measure of internal consistency similar to the one used in this study. Item response theory (IRT) may hold promise as a method for the development and selection of items for such a measure. IRT could help elucidate the items (i.e., trials) that best distinguish between those with normative levels of internal consistency from those with abnormally low internal consistency. A more refined set of trials could improve the future measurement of internal consistency. A well-validated, standardized, and relatively short instrument to this end would almost certainly find both clinical and research applications.
In conclusion, the real-world decision-making deficit associated with vmPFC damage carries implications for decisionmaking research and clinical case management. Although widely recognized, this deficit has been difficult to measure empirically and has not yet been fully characterized. The present study sought to both provide a novel paradigm for measuring this deficit in the laboratory as well as elucidate stimulus correlates of this deficit. The results of the present study sugThis document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
gested that decisions involving social information are associated with attenuated congruence between preferences and choices among patients with focal vmPFC lesions. Our work elaborates upon previous research by empirically demonstrating that this deficit can be captured in a multioption, multiattribute paradigm, and that the nature of the stimuli under deliberation can influence internal consistency among patients with vmPFC damage. These findings help to refine our understanding of the role of the vmPFC in decision making. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
(Appendices continue) picked spinach from his/her teeth during dinner at a fancy restaurant.
is extremely honest and truthful.
Person B . . . hawked loudly and then spat phlegm on the sidewalk.
brought cold drinks to the hardworking volunteers.
has some pretty awful habits and doesn't care if they bother other people.
stole money from the church collection.
Person C . . . visited a sick friend in the hospital.
hit the handicapped boy.
sent a card to a sick friend.
helped a friend move into a new house.
House Stimuli: Practice Trial
House A . . . has beautiful handles on the kitchen drawers.
has a built-in BBQ grill on the back porch.
has a significant crack in the foundation.
has a silent, odor-free trash compactor.
House B . . . has a broken garbage disposal.
has electric fixtures that all work properly.
has crayon writing all over the walls in the attic.
has beautiful views of the surrounding area.
House C . . . has faulty electrical wiring.
has freshly painted walls. has radon gas in the basement.
has planes taking off directly above the house.
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